A simple question about penal substitutionary atonement

I'm working on the atonement in the thought of John Wesley and the general consensus is that Wesley's basic understanding is synonymous with the penal substitutionary version of the satisfaction theory of the atonement (even if other 'models' or 'theories' are implicit in his thought elsewhere). From what I have found, the consensus is fairly accurate. For the most part, even though he didn't write a major treatise on the subject, when Wesley addresses the atonement specifically, the concept is predominantly (though not exclusively) latent with language of punishment and satisfaction. I.e., the punishment that was due humanity was laid upon Christ in our stead. As a 'theory,' penal substitution is a bit more elaborate but this is the basic gist of it.

Now all sorts of questions and criticisms are brought out against this theory: its caricature is that of Divine child abuse; it is entirely forensic and doesn't do justice to the relational nature of God and humans; it sets the Persons of the Trinity at odds with one another - actually it only gives treatment of the Father and the Son, so the Spirit fits in how?; it is merely a legal fiction, since the Innocent is counted guilty and, conversely, the guilty deemed innocent without any necessary action beforehand or afterward on their part; in light of this, there is little to no call to discipleship inherently linked to this portrayal; given the dependence of the theory on the idea of punishment being transferred, the only logical conclusion in terms of the scope of its effects is for all to be saved (universalism) or that he only received the punishment for those who will be 'saved' (limited atonement); it is inherently tied to a Western understanding of justice...the language is centred on 'guilt'; therefore, in many cultures, this theory isn't intelligible as it does not speak to the concepts of justice, guilt and/or shame as they are understood within the cultures; in many situations where the gospel can be shared, it doesn't seem to be the most pastorally appropriate way to share "good news" (imagine laying a guilt trip about the individual sins on the shoulders of someone who has been enslaved in a human trafficking scheme...language of penalty is quite appropriate to those doing the enslaving, but not for the ones in bondage...they need to be rescued); along similar lines, the theory, seemingly, does not do justice to the powers of evil enslaving humanity that need to be dealt with and overcome; and perhaps most importantly, it does not seem to necessitate the entire Incarnation nor does it adequately give place to the resurrection of Jesus.

Though it would take a lengthy series of posts to respond to each of these criticisms, which I won't do at this point, I will say that many of these objections can be overcome by conditioning this 'theory' to NOT serve as THE explanation of Christ's death (as is so often done in many Western theological portrayals) but as ONE aspect (even an important one) of the saving significance of Jesus' death. In addition, the theory tends to run into problems when too much mathematical calculations are brought into the mix, which tends to lead to the problem of universalism vs. limited atonement. Such tempering demotes this idea from the realm of 'theory' (which as I understand it, seems to be more all-inclusive as an explanation of something) to the realm of 'model,' at best, or to merely speak of it in its elements, themes, and motifs.

But even given this tempering, there is one additional critique for which I have not seen a sufficient response. The question is: "What is the nature of the punishment due to humanity?" Most Western Christians (at least those who primarily ascribe to this idea of 'penal substitution') would say that the punishment due to us is not only our physical death, but eternal punishment in a place called 'hell' (see, for instance, John Wesley's sermon, 'The Way to the Kingdom,' II.4, found in Bicentennial edition of his works, edited by Albert Outler, 1:228). If this is so, can we really say that the punishment laid upon Christ was that which was due to us? If so, then why is Christ not in hell enduring our eternal punishment? Maybe I'm taking this too much to its logical conclusion or bringing in too much mathematical idealism with talk of equivalence of punishment, but the idea seems pretty central even to what the idea/theme/model/theory (whatever you want to call it) is titled: penal substitution. The main response I've seen to this objection is that what we have is not really a substitution but what God sees as enough for a substitute...or 'a substitute for the substitute,' as I have heard said.

This seems to be the biggest issue to me for the nature of the idea itself, not because it is the most morally challenging critique (because it isn't), but because the modification that this criticism ('substitute for the substitute') requires of the idea is such that requires the language and idea to actually be changed. The other critiques (several with which I am sympathetic) just require the tempering or toning down of the theory. Thoughts?